For a while, the Pittsburgh Pirates made believers out of people who had trained themselves not to believe. They hit, they scored and they played meaningful baseball. By the All-Star break, the Pirates had done something this franchise had accomplished only twice before in the All-Star era: lead the majors in runs scored. For a fan base accustomed to watching good pitching get wasted by an offense that could turn three hits into an all-night project, it felt like a breakthrough. It increasingly looks like a mirage.
The Pirates have fallen six games below .500 and into last place in the National League Central. They have gone from being on the edge of postseason contention to watching their season rapidly slip away. This is no longer a short slump that can be dismissed with a hot week or a few returning players. It is a collapse, and it demands an honest examination of the roster, manager Don Kelly and the baseball operation constructed by Ben Cherington.
The Hitting Has Disappeared
The place to begin is the offense because that is where the illusion has been exposed most dramatically. The season totals still flatter the Pirates. Their total number of runs remains among the best in baseball, but cumulative statistics can hide the direction of a season. A team can pile up runs in April, May and a handful of blowouts, then spend weeks looking helpless when the games tighten. That is exactly what has happened to Pittsburgh.
The Pirates recently scored nine runs in a shutout victory over the New York Mets. They followed that performance by scoring one run the next day and then only two runs over their next two games against Miami. In a 2-0 loss to the Marlins, no Pirates runner advanced beyond first base. That is the problem with calling this a good offense simply because the year-to-date run total says so.
A productive lineup is not defined by how loudly it scores during occasional blowouts. It is defined by the quality of its at-bats when the opposing starting pitcher is sharp, when runners reach scoring position and when one run can decide the game. Too often, Pirates at-bats have become hurried, passive or predictable. They chase pitches outside the strike zone, fail to adjust as games progress and allow pitchers to dictate every confrontation. They appear to go to the plate without a clear two-strike approach.
Pittsburgh has struck out 1,127 times through 122 games, an average of 9.43 strikeouts per game. That is the third-highest total in Major League Baseball. Put another way, the Pirates give away the equivalent of more than three full innings of outs to strikeouts almost every night.
Strikeouts are part of modern baseball. A powerful lineup that hits home runs and consistently produces extra-base hits can survive a high strikeout total. The Pirates cannot pretend all strikeouts are the same, however. Too many of Pittsburgh’s strikeouts come without a productive alternative. There is no ball put in play, no runner advanced and no pressure placed on the opposing defense.
When the home runs disappear and the big innings stop coming, the lack of a two-strike approach becomes glaring. The early-season scoring binge did not prove the Pirates had permanently fixed their offense. It covered cracks that opposing pitchers eventually discovered and exploited. The Pirates may have led the league in runs, but the underlying problems were always there. As the season progressed, those problems became more difficult to hide. That is why the early offensive success now feels like a mirage.
Stop Blaming the Pitcher on the Hill
It has also become tiresome hearing Don Kelly offer some version of the same explanation after another quiet night at the plate: The guy on the hill had his best stuff tonight. How many times can that be the answer?
Of course, opposing pitchers are talented. Major League Baseball is filled with pitchers capable of dominating on any given night, and sometimes a pitcher truly does have exceptional command and unhittable stuff. But it cannot be the explanation every time the Pirates produce another lifeless offensive performance. At some point, the problem is not the pitcher on the hill. The problem is that Pittsburgh’s hitters lack the ability to adjust.
If a pitcher is getting hitters out with breaking balls away, the lineup must stop chasing them. If he is working ahead with first-pitch fastballs, hitters must be ready to attack. If the same approach is failing for the first three or four innings, the batting order cannot continue repeating it and expect a different result.
Good offenses make pitchers work. They change their approach with two strikes, shorten their swings, use the opposite field and look for ways to manufacture a run when the home run is not available. The Pirates too often look exactly the same in the eighth inning as they did in the first. That is not simply a matter of the opposing pitcher having great stuff. It is a failure to recognize what is happening and respond to it.
When Kelly repeatedly credits the opposing pitcher, it begins to sound less like respect and more like an excuse. It shifts attention away from the hitters, the coaching staff and an offensive philosophy that has failed to produce answers. The Pirates need to stop admiring the quality of the opposing pitcher and start asking why their own hitters are so often incapable of adjusting to him.
The Bullpen Cost Them Too Many Games
The front office deserves just as much scrutiny for the bullpen because that problem announced itself early and loudly. By late June, Pirates relievers had blown 17 of 34 save opportunities. That is not a rough patch. That is a structural failure.
The Pirates had already blown 10 saves by the middle of May. They also lost seven games in which the offense scored at least six runs. Think about that for a moment. This was an organization that spent years claiming it needed more offense to support its talented pitchers. When the Pirates finally started scoring runs, the bullpen repeatedly gave those runs back.
On April 27, Pittsburgh carried a 2-0 lead over the St. Louis Cardinals into the ninth inning after holding St. Louis hitless through six. The bullpen surrendered four runs, including two home runs, and the Pirates lost 4-2. On May 15, the Pirates led the Philadelphia Phillies 8-3 in the seventh inning. That should have been a comfortable victory. Instead, the bullpen blew the lead and Pittsburgh lost in extra innings.
Those were not isolated heartbreakers. They were alarms, and Ben Cherington and the front office waited too long to respond. Every contender blows games, and even the best relievers go through difficult stretches. Serious contenders, however, do not spend months watching the same weakness cost them games while hoping the existing players will suddenly become something they have not been.
The Pirates had a starting rotation capable of keeping them in the race. At the time, they also had an offense scoring enough runs to win. The bullpen kept giving games away, and management treated urgency like an optional expense.
Those losses mattered then, even if they feel distant now. A game blown in April counts exactly as much in the standings as one lost in September. Pittsburgh’s margin for error was never large enough to donate winnable games for half a season. By the time the rest of the team began to collapse, the bullpen had already squandered the cushion the Pirates desperately needed. The organization waited too long to make meaningful changes, and now it is paying the price.
Injuries Hurt, but They Cannot Excuse Everything
Injuries absolutely belong in the story of this season. Oneil Cruz, Konnor Griffin and Spencer Horwitz have missed time. Ryan O’Hearn, one of the team’s steadiest hitters and most important clubhouse voices, is expected to miss six to eight weeks with another quad injury. Mitch Keller’s season-ending injury weakened the rotation, while Jared Jones has had to work his way back after elbow surgery and has not consistently looked like the pitcher the Pirates hoped he would become this season.
No fair evaluation can pretend those absences did not matter. When multiple important players are removed from the lineup, the offense will suffer. When starting pitchers are injured or limited, additional pressure is placed on the bullpen. There is no question that injuries contributed to Pittsburgh’s decline.
But injuries explain only part of the collapse. They do not explain months of bullpen negligence. They do not excuse repeated uncompetitive at-bats. They do not account for sloppy defensive baseball, poor situational awareness or a team that too often appears flat at precisely the moment it should be playing with urgency.
Every major-league team deals with injuries. Contenders find ways to survive them. Strong organizations develop enough depth to withstand injuries without completely falling apart. They make adjustments, promote players, acquire help and change their approach. The Pirates have instead looked like an organization waiting for someone else to solve the problem. Injuries deserve to be considered, but they should not be used as a shield that protects everyone from accountability.
It Is Time to Examine Don Kelly
That brings the focus back to Don Kelly. Kelly inherited a difficult situation and deserves credit for giving the Pirates an initial spark. The players appeared to respond to him, and for much of the first half Pittsburgh played an entertaining and aggressive style of baseball. There was more energy, the offense was producing and the Pirates looked like a team that believed it could compete.
But a manager is evaluated by more than the initial spark he creates. He is also evaluated by the standards he maintains when the season turns against his team. The Pirates have been losing series after series. Following another lifeless loss to the Marlins, Kelly said the Pirates needed to compete. He was correct, but when a manager must publicly demand competitive effort in the middle of August, the next question is unavoidable: Why was that effort missing in the first place, and why has the coaching staff been unable to restore it?
Kelly should be examined closely. That does not mean he should automatically be fired or blamed for every problem created by the front office. It does mean the Pirates must honestly evaluate his performance. The organization needs to examine the team’s hitting approach, bullpen management, defensive sharpness and day-to-day intensity. It must determine whether Kelly is getting through to the players and whether the standards being discussed behind closed doors are actually being enforced on the field.
The organization also must examine the message being delivered after games. Constantly crediting the opposing pitcher does nothing to address the fact that Pirates hitters continue to repeat the same mistakes. If the club cannot make in-game adjustments, that reflects on the players, the hitting coaches and the manager. “They battled” and “the guy on the hill had his best stuff” cannot remain the default postgame explanations after another night filled with empty at-bats and careless baseball.
At some point, effort must produce results, and preparation must show up in the way the team plays. If the Pirates are consistently being outplayed, outprepared or outhustled, the manager must be part of the conversation.
Ben Cherington Deserves Even More Scrutiny
Cherington deserves the harder examination because this is his roster and his organizational timeline. He cannot continue asking Pittsburgh to grade the Pirates on potential while the major-league club fails in familiar ways. The purpose of building pitching depth and collecting young talent is to eventually produce a winner. It is not to create an endless supply of reasons why winning must wait another year.
Cherington knew the bullpen was a major problem early in the season. He saw the blown saves, the late leads disappear and games that should have been victories turn into crushing losses. The front office still waited.
That lack of urgency is particularly frustrating because the Pirates had an opportunity. The National League playoff race was open, the offense was producing and the starting pitching gave the team a chance. This was the moment to be aggressive. Instead, the organization again appeared hesitant to commit to winning.
That approach sends a message to the players and the fan base. It tells everyone that management is more concerned about preserving future flexibility than maximizing a rare opportunity in the present. Pirates fans have heard about the future for years. At some point, the future must arrive.
Cherington should be asked why the bullpen was allowed to remain unstable for so long. He should be asked whether the organization properly evaluated its relievers during the offseason and why it failed to react when those evaluations proved incorrect. He should also be asked whether the Pirates have the proper hitting philosophy throughout the organization. This is not simply about one bad month. It is about whether the people running the team can identify problems and fix them before another season is lost.
Oneil Cruz and the Question of Effort
Oneil Cruz is a test case for the entire organization. Few players in baseball possess his combination of size, speed and raw power. Few players are capable of changing a game so quickly with one swing, one throw or one sprint around the bases. That is precisely why the lackadaisical moments are so infuriating.
Pirates broadcasters criticized Cruz’s casual defensive effort during the opening series of this season, and the concern was not new. Kelly benched Cruz in 2025 because of what he described as an issue involving Cruz’s “energy and effort” following a mental mistake.
This is not about demanding that Cruz perform emotion for the crowd or judging his personality from a television screen. It is about observable baseball habits. Get the ball back to the infield, know how many outs there are, run hard, stay engaged defensively, understand the situation and show urgency when the game demands it. Those are reasonable expectations for every major-league player, regardless of talent level.
The Pirates cannot build a winning culture while allowing talent to lower the standard. Cruz should be coached hard, held accountable and given every opportunity to respond. If he responds, he can still become a cornerstone of this team. If he does not, the organization must stop treating potential as immunity.
There comes a time when a player must be evaluated by what he consistently does, not by what everyone believes he could eventually become. Cruz is too talented to play casually, and the Pirates are not good enough to tolerate it. The organization must demand more from him because his talent should make him part of the solution, not another symbol of the problem.
The Pirates Need a Change in Attitude
The larger issue is attitude. That does not mean chest-thumping, dugout theatrics or empty slogans. It means professional urgency.
A winning attitude shows up in two-strike at-bats, clean defense, intelligent baserunning and a refusal to waste a strong pitching performance. It shows up when a relief pitcher attacks the strike zone instead of nibbling until the bases are loaded. It shows up when hitters adjust after seeing how an opposing pitcher attacked them during their first two plate appearances. It shows up when an outfielder throws the ball back to the infield with purpose and when a runner goes hard down the line even on a routine ground ball.
The Pirates need more Ryan O’Hearns and fewer Oneil Cruzes. They need more players who bring consistency, professionalism and urgency to the ballpark every day. Talent matters, but talent without intensity, accountability and leadership will not change the culture of this organization.
They need the fire that A.J. Burnett brought to Pittsburgh the last time the Pirates had a winning team. Burnett was more than a productive pitcher. He brought an edge and credibility to the clubhouse. He expected to win, demanded accountability and helped change the way the Pirates viewed themselves.
This team needs players willing to establish that kind of standard. It needs veterans who will speak up when the effort is not good enough, challenge teammates when the details are being ignored and refuse to accept losing as just another part of the schedule. The Pirates need leaders.
They need players who will not wait for Kelly to remind everyone publicly that they must compete. They need players who understand that urgency should come from inside the clubhouse, not only from the manager’s office. Leadership is not about giving speeches after losses. It is about setting an example before those losses occur. It is about preparation, effort, accountability and refusing to allow the same mistakes to continue unchecked.
That attitude must also show up in the front office. A winning organization does not wait until the trade deadline to acknowledge a bullpen problem that was obvious in April. It acts before the weakness becomes a season killer. A winning attitude must begin with the people responsible for setting the organization’s expectations, and it must apply equally to stars, veterans, rookies, coaches, executives and ownership.
The Pirates do not need another cosmetic reset. They need a change in expectations. That means scrutinizing Kelly’s ability to lead the next phase of the organization. It means deciding whether Cherington has earned the right to oversee another offseason. It means rebuilding the bullpen before it costs the Pirates another season. It means developing a more adaptable hitting approach and holding talented players accountable for the details that separate exciting highlights from winning baseball.
Most of all, it means finding players who bring the fire, leadership and winning expectations that Burnett once brought to Pittsburgh. The Pirates have enough players with potential. They need more players who refuse to accept losing.
The first-half run total was fun, but it was also misleading. The Pirates looked like an offensive force, but the strikeouts, bullpen failures and lapses in urgency were always present beneath the surface.
Now the mirage is gone. What remains is a baseball organization with difficult questions to answer and no excuse for waiting too long again.